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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in overuling the motion to suppress based on a finding of no 
seizure or detention where the officers spoke with Appellant and in the process of 
questioning him Appellant stopped his bike and officers found controlled substances and 
paraphernalia? Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pgs 5 through 25. 
2. Did the trial Court err in overuling Appellant's motion to suppress based on the 
evidence then submitted to the court? Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pgs 5 through 25. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
For both issues herein presented for review the standard of review is the clearly 
erroneous standard. State v Pena. 869 P.2d 932.939 (Utah 19941 The question of whether 
the facts presented in the appeal give rise to a reasonable suspicion to support the 
investigatory stop is a question of law and the reviewing court reviews the appeal non-
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deferentially for correctness with a measure of discretion to the trial court when applying this 
standard to the facts of the case. Pena at 939. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Page 
Section 77-7-15 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 6,14 
Section 77-7-16 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 6,7,14 
Amendment IV of the U.S. Constitution 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Padgett was charged in an Information with Count I, Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree felony; Count II, Possession of a Controlled Substance, 
a Class B misdemeanor; and Count III, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
Appellant filed a motion to suppress which was heard by the trial court on April 21, 
1998. The court overuled Appellant's motion to suppress. 
The Appellant pled guilty before the Honorable James L Shumate to all charges on 
April 28, 1998. On April 28, 1998 the court sentenced Appellant to 0-5 years in the Utah 
State Prison on Count I and stayed the imposition of sentence on Counts II and III and ran 
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this case concurrent with the sentence in Case Number 971501309. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's trial counsel filed a motion to suppress which was denied by the trial court. 
The two officers who testified at the suppression hearing testified that while on bike patrol 
and fully uniformed with weapons they observed Appellant sitting and eventually leaving 
with his bike near Albertson's grocery store in the K-Mart shopping plaza when one of the 
officers recognized Appellant as a defendant in a previous drug case involving two totally 
different peace officers. Based upon this belief they approached the Appellant and engaged 
him in conversation. Ultimately, both officers and Appellant stopped their bikes and 
Appellant gave his consent to search. During the search the officers located controlled 
substances and paraphernalia and arrested Appellant. Rec. 66 Statement of Facts ppgs 5 
through 24. The court found that when Appellant stopped he did so voluntarily and was free 
to go; accordingly, the court found no seizure. Rec. 66, Statement of Facts ppgs. 35-36. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Section 77-7'-15 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure states that "A peace officer 
may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions". Further, Section 77-7-16 of 
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the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure states that "A peace officer who has stopped a person 
temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably 
believes he or any other person is in danger". In the instant case there was no reasonable 
suspicion for the officers to even approach the Appellant or ask his name, address or 
explanation of his actions nor was there any reason to request a search of his person. Under 
the totality of circumstances Appellant or a reasonable person in Appellant's position would 
not have felt he or she was free to go and in essence Appellant was seized for Fourth 
amendment purposes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN OVERULING THE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BASED ON A FINDING OF NO 
SEIZURE OR DETENTION WHERE THE OFFICERS SPOKE 
WITH APPELLANT AND IN THE PROCESS OF 
QUESTIONING HIM APPELLANT STOPPED HIS BIKE AND 
OFFICERS FOUND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AND 
PARAPHERNALIA? 
The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the public from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, not every contact between law enforcement 
and private individuals amounts to a "seizure". In the instant case the trial court denied and 
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overuled the Appellant's motion to suppress because the court found no seizure. The court 
in Terry v Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) defined 
seizure as whenever a peace officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk 
away. The test to be applied is not subjective but rather an objective test. State v Ramirez. 
817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah App. 1997). The court in U.S. vsMerritt 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 
1984) identified the following types of contact between law enforcment and private 
individuals: 
(1) a peace officer may approach an individual anytime and ask questions so long as 
the individual is not detained against his or her will (purely consensual). 
(2) a peace officer may seize a person if there is an articulable suspicion concerning 
a crime that has been committed or is being committed or about to be committed so long as 
the detention is temporary and lasts no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop. 
(3) a peace officer may arrest an individual if there is probable cause to believe that 
crime has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed. 
The primary difference between the first and second types of contact as noted above 
depends on whether through physical force or authority the individual believes that his 
freedom of movement is restrained. U.S. vs MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544.553,100 S.Ct. 1870, 
1877,64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). There is no real concern in this case that the peace officers 
here used physical force; however, it is clear that their authority was apparent and 
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compelling. Seizure occurs only if in view of all circumstances surrounding the incident the 
reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to go. Mendenhall id. 
Here, the Appellant was "sitting on a planter and had got on his bicycle to pedal off', 
Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pg 6, when the officers spotted him. The two officers 
(McCracken and Isaacson) were in uniform, armed Rec 66, Statement of Facts pg 13 and on 
bicycles themselves Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pg 5. Officer McCracken recognized (or 
"was quite sure") the Appellant as being an individual who had been arrested by two different 
officers two to three weeks earlier for shoplifting and possession of controlled substances. 
Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pg 6, Officer McCracken stated these identification facts to 
Officer Isaacson, and Officer Isaacson then initiated contact with Appellant. Appellant 
stopped his bike after the officer made "casual" contact with him. Rec. 66, Statement of 
Facts pgs 6,8, Officer Isaacson continued the conversation while Officer McCracken pulled 
up on the other side of Appellant. Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pg 13. Officer McCracken 
then took over the interrogation and asked Appellant his name and if he was the same 
individual arrested by the officers two to three weeks prior. Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pgs 
8-9. Even more intrusive was the check for a warrant initiated by Officer McCracken. Rec. 
66, Statement of Facts pg 9. Officer McCracken then asked Appellant if he was in 
possession of any drugs at this time and received a response of "no". Rec 66, Statement of 
Facts pg 9. Officer McCracken then requested and received Appellant's consent to search 
whereupon controlled substances and paraphernalia was discovered. Rec. 66, Statement of 
Facts pgs 10-11. The trial court in overuling the motion to suppress indicated that the 
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officers approached Appellant for the purpose of finding out if he was the same person who 
had been reported to Officer McCracken as having been arrested approximately three weeks 
prior and that there was no coercive action on the part of the officers. Rec. 66, Statement 
of Facts pg 36. The court's findings simply are not consistent with the testimony introduced. 
It is true that Officer McCracken testified that the reason for his approaching Appellant was 
to "find out if he was who I thought he was", Rec. 66 Statement of Facts pg 10 Ln 9-10, and 
"...to see how he was doing and if he had any warrants from the earlier arrest". Rec. 66, 
Statement of Facts pg 10 Ln 19-23. However, the officer indicated he had no reasonable 
suspicion to make the stop. Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pg 13 Ln 22-25. The testimony also 
was that officer McCracken was on one side of and to the rear of Appellant and that Officer 
Isaacson was on the other side to the front ("for officer safety reasons"). Rec. 66, Statement 
of Facts pg 14 Ln 4-10. The testimony also was that the Officers asked Appellant his name, 
if he was the same individual previously arrested and if he was in possession of drugs. Rec. 
66, Statement of Facts pg 9 Ln 10-25. If the officers were only for the purpose of finding 
out if he was the same person who had been reported to Officer McCracken as having been 
arrested approximately three weeks prior then the interrogation would have ended there. 
However, the officer, after doing a warrants check and finding no warrants and after asking 
if there were drugs and getting a negative response, continued the detention and intrusion 
and asked if he could search Appellant. It is clear that in the instant case the officers singled 
Appellant out from among other folks because of the statement of other officers that drugs 
had been found on this Appellant two to three weeks prior and the Officers here hope to find 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
drugs again. The trial court also erred in finding no coercive action on the part of the 
officers. Appellant had been arrested two to three weeks prior by law enforcement and had 
been released from jail when yet another set of officers in uniform and armed approached 
him and asked him questions concerning his identity and his prior case. Further, the officers 
"positioned" themselves "for officer safety reasons" on both sides of Appellant presumably 
restricting Appellant's movement or travel to those particular directions although there 
appeared to be free access to travel in the direction his was traveling prior to the stop. Rec. 
66, Statement of Facts pg 14 Ln 4-10. At any rate under the totality of facts and 
circumstances in this case specifically with one officer on one side and to the rear of 
Appellant and one officer to the front and other side of Appellant a reasonable person would 
not have believed himself or herself free to leave. Moreover, officers who engage in "casual 
conversation" with a citizen do not ordinarily do an on-site warrants check and position 
themselves for officer safety reasons. These are the types of activities conducted ordinarily 
by officers who feel they have reasonable suspicion or probable cause none of which existed 
in the instant case. Notwithstanding the use of key phrases such as "At no time was that 
impeded or was he told he was not free to leave", Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pg 14 Ln 9-10, 
Appellant was not free to leave and no reasonable person (particularly in his circumstances) 
would have believed himself or herself free to leave. The court in State vTrujillo, 739 P.2d 
85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) held that the question is whether the defendant remained, not 
in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he believed he was 
not free to go. Here, it is clear that defendant answer the officer's questions reasonably and 
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in a fashion that would not warrant further detention. Moreover, if the Appellant indicates 
to the officer that he had no drugs, yet he had drugs; there is a question of whether Appellant 
was continuing in the spirit of cooperation. Here, supposedly the officer and court felt there 
was no investigation with which to cooperate. 
There are a number of cases concerning seizures involving persons in parked vehicles 
or on foot; however, the case more closely on point to the instant case concerning its relevant 
facts is the ruling in State v Carter. 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), although Carter was an 
airport case. The officers of the Utah State Narcotics agency while dressed in street clothes 
noticed defendant in that case as he scanned the area and looked in the area of the officers 
three times. Then, he walked up the escalator quickening his pace and exited the airport 
terminal at a quick pace. The defendant then went to a taxi and placed his bag into the taxi. 
One of the two officers then approached the defendant and identified himself as an officer 
and asked to speak with him. The defendant agreed and removed his bag from the taxi. The 
officer suggested they move to an area approximately 20 feet away to which the defendant 
agreed. The other officer arrived about the time the first officer was asking the defendant 
for identification. The defendant indicated he did not have any and bent over to look in his 
bag for identification at which point the officer noted something protruding through 
defendant's shirt. Defendant was asked if one of the officers could search his bag, and he 
consented. At the same time the other officer asked if he could search the defendant's 
person, and he consented. During the search a bulge was discovered and later found to be 
drugs. This court in Carter noted the following circumstances and factors indicating that 
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a seizure had occurred that have been considered by other courts: the presence of several 
uniformed officers, display of a weapon, physical touching of the individual, length of the 
interview, blocking the individual's path, removing the individual to a private place, 
statements by police that an investigation has focused on him or her and searching an 
individual's belongings or person. This court went further by reviewing the the decisions 
in United States v Gonzales. 842 F.2d 748,751-52 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the initially 
voluntary encounter changed to a seizure when the undercover officer informed the 
defendant that he was "working narcotics" and asked to look into her bag); United States v 
Galberth. 846F.2d 983 (5th Cir.) cert, denied, 488 U.S. 865,109 S.Ct 167,102L.Ed.2d 137 
(1988) (noting that when the officers requested that the defendant submit to a pat-down 
search a seizure occurred requiring reasonable suspicion); and United States v Poitien 818 
F.2d679(8thCir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1006,108S.Ct 700,98L.Ed.2d651 (1988) 
which held that a seizure occurred when the officers stated that they suspected the defendant 
of carrying drugs and read the defendant her Miranda rights. Finally, this court held in 
Carter that a seizure occurred at least at the point where the second officer (Fullmer) asked 
to conduct a pat-down search. In the instant case, many of these circumstances and factors 
are present. For example, there were two officers, in uniform and armed. Further, one or 
both officers asked Appellant some questions concerning identity, the past and present 
criminal activity of Appellant, whether he possessed controlled substances at the time and 
concerning opportunity to search Appellant. Moreover, a couple of factors present in this 
case, suggesting seizure, not present in the Carter case or some of the federal cases analyzed 
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by this court in Carter are the facts that the officer(s) did a warrants check and took 
"adversarial type" positions for officer safety. Although Appellant's original direction of 
travel appeared to be open after the officers' arrival there reasonably appeared to be some 
blocking or restraining of Appellant's path laterally due to the officers' rear and forward 
positions on either side of appellant. This court in Carter appeared to focus on the search 
of the defendant's person in finding a seizure although many if not all of the other 
factors/circumstances considered by this court in its decision were not found in the Carter 
case itself. In the instant case, however, there are some of those same circumstances 
present, as well as a couple of other factors along with the request for the search of 
Appellant's person (as was the case in Carter). This court in Carter reversed the trial court's 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress; reversal is appropriate here as well. 
POINT II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN OVERULING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BASED ON THE 
EVIDENCE THEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT? 
Section 77-7-15 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure states that a peace officer 
may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe that he 
was, is or will be engaged in this criminal activity. Section 77-7-16 of the Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure states that an officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any 
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other person is in danger. 
These two sections appear to codify the rule from Terry v Ohio, id wherein the court set forth 
a two prong test concerning 4th amendment seizures: the initial stop must be justified and 
the subsequent actions of the officers must be within the scope of the circumstances 
justifying the stop. The court further held that the totality of the facts and circumstances 
had to be considered in determining whether there were specific articulable facts giving rise 
to a reasonable suspicion. Terry at 21. Clearly, there was no reasonable suspicion as 
articulated by the officers in their testimony during the suppression hearing. In fact, Officer 
McCracken testified that reasonable suspicion was not necessary. Rec. 66, Statement of 
Facts pg 11 Ln 1-2. Later, the same officer stated that he did not have reasonable suspicion. 
Rec. 66, Statement of Facts pg 13 Ln 22-25. Further, none of the evidence offered by the 
state meets the Terry standard or Utah statute for stopping an individual because there was 
no reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. 
Although Appellant eventually gave his consent to the pat-down search that consent 
was not lawfully obtained. For the consent to be lawfully obtained the consent must be 
voluntary and the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. 
Carter at 467 citing State v Robinson. 797 P.2d 431,437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Appellant 
was seized at least at the time the officer requested that he allow a search of his person as in 
Carter. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein alleged, the Court erred by denying Appellant's motion to 
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suppress and the Appellant was denied a fair trial in Case No. 971501416, and the judgment 
and sentence should be set aside and Appellant granted a new trial. 
ADDENDUM 
Please see Addendum 
DATED on this the 06th day of May, 1999 
SHERRI PALMER^&ASSOCIATES 
By: Kenneth L. Combs 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Brief has been served on the Office 
of the Attorney General, by delivery of a true copy to her via regular mail on the 06th day of 
May, 1999. 
b 
KENNETH L. COMBS 
&M 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
Amendment IV of the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
i 
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